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INTRODUCTION 
  
The English model of land registration was established to bring greater certainty into title by 
visibly vesting title in a registered proprietor free from unprotected interests and conferring 
powers of disposition. Yet the defining test of a system’s commitment to the register as a 
source of title - what happens when the register has been changed when it should not have 
been - is answered by an explicit statutory power to reallocate title as a matter 
of discretion. That this discretion ever gained traction is surprising since it challenges the 
central tenet that a register entry is effective to confer good title.[1] 
            The scope of the power to sustain or to correct an entry due to fraud or error, and the 
place of that power within the registration system have been the subject ofacademic scrutiny. 
Scholarly research has taken a doctrinal perspective which is informative in testing the 
parameters of the judicial power, promoting internal consistency, and addressing the effects 
of different interpretative options. As a substantial body of case law has now built up in this 
area, this article changes tack by undertaking an analysis of the law in action to supplement 
the doctrinal literature. This article reports on a systematic, empirical examination of case law 
that was undertaken to investigate the exercise of the discretionary power to correct mistaken 
entries in the land register. It explores what the judicial component brings to decision making 
and how that might colour the understanding of land registration. 
            The following section will give an overview of the legal framework in which the 
discretion operates before the article moves on to explain the study undertaken. The findings 
are then described and analysed with discussion of their implications. 
  
  
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DISCRETION 
TO CORRECT REGISTER ENTRIES 
  
In the event of a mistaken entry, the English system has for almost a century avoided a fixed, 
uniform rule and has instead determined the issue of correction as a matter of statutory 
discretion.The Land Registration Act 1925 declared, ‘The register may be rectified pursuant 
to an order of the court or by the registrar’.[2] The power extended to a collection of specified 
circumstances, the last of which covered ‘any other case where, by reason of any error or 
omission in the register, or by reason of any entry made under a mistake, it may be deemed 
just to rectify the register.’[3] The 1925 Act was replaced by the Land Registration Act 
2002: ‘The court may make an order for alteration of the register for the purpose of- (a) 
correcting a mistake...’[4] The new correction power sits alongside distinct powers to alter the 
register for the purposes of bringing it up to date and of giving effect to rights excepted from 
the effect of registration.[5] 
            The exercise of the correction power is not left unregulated. It must be exercised in 
favour of correcting unless there are ‘exceptional circumstances’.[6] Although this may be 
described as a discretion[7], in comparison to the 1925 Act its scope is rather limited as the 
starting point is not an even balancing of equities but the imposition of a duty. This leads to a 
process of adjudication which differs under the 2002 Act: 
  
‘the court must ask itself two questions: (1) are there exceptional circumstances in this 
case? and (2) do those exceptional circumstances justify not making the alteration? 
The first of these questions requires one to know what is meant by “exceptional 
circumstances” and then to establish whether such circumstances exist as a matter of 
fact.’[8] 
  
Where the correction of a mistake would prejudicially affect the title of a registered 
proprietor, known as ‘rectification’, two special consequences follow. First, the power is 
regulated differently again. No order for correction of the entry may be made in relation to 
land in the proprietor’s possession unless he has ‘by fraud or lack of proper care caused or 
substantially contributed to the mistake’ or it would for any other reason be ‘unjust for the 
alteration not to be made.’[9] Those two conditions substantially replicate provisions also 
found in the 1925 Act.[10] If either is present, then the power is restored and must once more 
be exercised unless there are exceptional circumstances.[11] Secondly, the power is 
supplemented by state compensation for whichever party suffers from the adverse exercise of 
discretion, whether the entry is rectified or allowed to stand.[12] 
            There is scarcely an element of the power to correct that has escaped controversy. 
This is important to the present exercise because the doctrinal ambiguity might affect the 
exercise of discretion. In particular, judicial descriptions of the material relevant to the 
exercise of discretion are likely to depend on the interpretation of the legal parameters within 
which the discretion operates. The first set of controversies have concerned the scope of the 
correction power. ‘Mistake’, the criterion which determines whether an entry is liable to 
correction, has been elusive.[13]There has been doubt whether a mistake will persist following 
a disposition or whether the mistake is thereby expunged.[14] There is a related issue over 
what may be ordered for the purpose of correction: whether an entry could be corrected 
though it is not itself a mistake[15], and whether correction operates retrospectively.[16] If there 
is a power to correct against a transferee, then it raises the issue of the nature of the claim to 
rectification, whether it might be governed by statutory priority rules and, if so, which of 
them.[17] These are matters with which case law has begun to grapple, but which remain far 
from satisfactorily concluded. 
            The second subject of debate has been the integration of the correction power into the 
land registration scheme. This is seen in the enduring discussion of how the correction power 
interacts with the rule that title vests by virtue of registration. While the rule undoubtedly 
vests the legal estate,[18] there has been concern over whether it carries the full beneficial 
interest. That prompts questions over the interface between that provision and residual 
principles of equity; in particular, whether there is scope left for resulting or constructive 
trusts[19] and whether the word changes from the 1925 Act to the 2002 Act would affect the 
availability of trusts.[20] If the proprietor has the mere shell of legal title through 
registration,[21] then equity’s imposition of a trust is taking the place that would otherwise be 
occupied by the statutory discretion to rectify the register - leaving any alteration proceedings 
without redistributive effect but only the limited function of bringing the register in line with 
the equitable entitlement. If encountered in correction proceedings, the lack of any prejudice 
to title would inevitably channel the decision maker’s characterisation of the case and lead to 
a strong inclination to correct.[22] 
            The specific concerns expressed in the literature reflect two broader issues. First, the 
degree to which the register may be portrayed as a reflection of existing title as opposed to a 
free-standing source of title;[23] and, second, the degree to which registration is being eroded 
by reactionary judicial attitudes which resist any passing of title without the owner’s 
consent.[24] Those issues are vital in understanding and appraising the registration system. An 
examination of the decision making which goes beyond studying the evolution of legal 
principles has the capacity to bring a different perspective to those issues. 
  
THE STUDY 
  
The special nature of discretionary decision making is such that only limited value can be 
extracted from applying doctrinal methods. Formal law has little to say here other than that 
the decision-maker may lawfully take account of relevant considerations; analysing indicative 
leading cases would not convey the breadth of accumulated experience.[25] In this study, 
therefore, judgments were not examined for the purpose of identifying emergent legal rules, 
but were instead mined for the factors deemed relevant to the exercise of discretion.[26] The 
study was devised to investigate the exercise of discretion in practice: what factors are taken 
into account in correction proceedings, what weight is accorded to them, what standard of 
cogency they must attain. To achieve this, the judgments were subjected to ‘content 
analysis’[27] in accordance with the recognised methodological guidelines.[28] 
            First, a systematic search was undertaken to unearth judgments on correction by the 
adjudicators[29] and courts.[30] The adjudicators’ judgments were taken from the Tribunals 
Judiciary website[31] and covered the period from the establishment of the office of 
Adjudicator until its abolition and the transfer of its jurisdiction to the First-tier 
Tribunal.[32] The final judgment was rendered on 4th November 2014. The court judgments 
were harvested from a database search from the date of enactment of the Land Registration 
Act 2002[33] to the same end date.[34] Second, to bring consistency into analysis and to allow 
comparison by standardised units, a scheme of categories of factors were created, and the 
discretionary factors considered in each judgment to be relevant to the exercise of discretion 
were systematically recorded and assigned to those categories. The purpose was to record the 
relevance of factors and consequently if a specific factor was addressed and stated not to be 
sufficiently potent to reach the relevant threshold then it was nevertheless included in the 
results since it was inferentially being recognised as potentially relevant. No attempt was 
made to capture the weight of each factor unless it was specifically reported in the judgment. 
            Tabulating the factors in that way was intended to facilitate the third step. This 
involved reviewing the results for the prevalence, scarcity and absence of particular factors, 
the coalescence of particular factors in judgments, any disproportion between the factual 
engagement of a factor and its mention in the judgment, the coincidence of factors in 
particular circumstances, the correlations of factors to judgment outcomes and the passing of 
legal thresholds. Using that information as the basis for further inquiry, the fourth step was to 
return to particular judgments for a more contextualised investigation of features that had 
prompted interest from the review. Each decision to return for further examination of 
judgments was taken to seek explanation for the following matters: the profile of the results 
(prevalence, distribution and variety in factors), the most extreme frequencies in results 
(highest and lowest tallies), associations amongst factors or between the factors and case 
properties (correlations or patterns), and results that were noteworthy for being out of line 
with expectations.[35] This stage was intended to impart better contextual understanding of 
judicial decision-making than that revealed from statistics. 
            The study examined the factors used in three discretionary regimes: the basic 
discretion under the 1925 Act; the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test of the 2002 Act; and the 
‘unjust not to [correct]’ test, which applies where the defendant proprietor was in possession 
under both Acts and which has the effect of restoring the correction power. All three 
discretions are apparently open as to the type of factor which the decision-maker may accept 
as relevant and are consequently comparable in regard to judicial selection and weighting of 
factors. In contrast, the ‘fraud’ and ‘lack of proper care’ tests, which apply where the 
defendantproprietor was in possession and which have the effect of restoring the correction 
power, each appoint one exclusive criterion for adjudication and do not invite the court to 
supply the relevant factors; unlike the ‘unjust’ test, they do not involve the same judicial role 
in handling discretionary factors and this study does not examine their application. 
            While the three discretions under consideration share the common features noted 
above, there are differences between them which may influence the results. First, as between 
the three discretions, the thresholds vary significantly. The 2002 Act prescribes no threshold 
for the cogency of factors but is merely that deemed sufficient to justify correction; 
conversely, the ‘just’ test under the 1925 Act suggests an assessment of factors for and 
against correction on the ‘balance of equities’[36] and it is implicitly less demanding that the 
‘unjust not to’ test,[37] although in both cases the lack of verbal elaboration leaves much to 
judicial standard-setting. Second, under the 1925 Act and the ‘unjust not to’ test, there is no 
legislative stipulation as to the attributes of the factors, whereas under the 2002 Act the 
attributes of the factors, singly or collectively, must meet the description of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’. Finally, the ‘unjust not to’ test serves the purpose of re-opening the door to 
correction, and so may not be on all fours with an actual determination whether to correct. 
The study takes the approach that, because of the latitude in determining relevance of factors 
in all three situations, there is no necessity to differentiate between the discretions for the 
purpose of examining the relevance of factors; in other matters, however, the three 
discretions are distinguished where appropriate. 
            There is also a change of emphasis from the 1925 Act to the 2002 Act which may 
influence the discretion. The 1925 Act enabled correction in a slightly broader range of 
enumerated cases[38] and certain provisions suggested that protection of disponees might not 
be dependent on registration alone[39], whereas the new Act takes a harder line that restricts 
correctable mistake,[40] reinforces title by registration,[41] and expands the definition of the 
protected proprietor in possession.[42] It reflects a conscious policy shift towards enhancing 
the conclusiveness of title acquired by registration,[43] which might permeate the exercise of 
the discretions. But the movement is not all one way, for the 2002 Act also imposes the 
hurdle of exceptional circumstances to resist correction. 
            A number of limitations were inherent in the design of the research. First and 
foremost, there was selection bias in the data set of adjudicators’ judgments because of their 
pre-selection by judicial panel before inclusion in the on-line database.[44] Nevertheless, there 
were numerous judgments by different judicial personnel, ranging over a decade, and across a 
wide cross-section of disputes, which was felt to be a sufficient spread of judicial reasoning 
to justify drawing inferences. Secondly, there was a risk of poor processes in cataloguing the 
factors, which was addressed through a pilot run, cross-checking and quality processes. 
Thirdly, during the qualitative analysis stage there was a risk that counts or patterns might 
have been overlooked due to the subjective nature of the triggers for further investigation 
which rested on the observations and expectations of the lead researcher. The small size of 
the data collected and the repeated re-presentation of the data in different formats assisted in 
ensuring that all opportunities to reveal noteworthy aspects were taken. 
  
THE FINDINGS: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
  
Presentation of Results 
  
There were 52 judgments dealing with correction. The unit of assessment was the judgment, 
so that appeal judgments in the same litigation (of which there were six) were coded as 
distinct units. Each judgment was examined for certain ‘properties’, which comprised various 
ascertained features of the dispute rather than the judicial expressions of potential influences 
on discretion. The following table shows the case properties, most of which reflect the criteria 
used in the various statutory terms. The exception is the column dealing with those cases in 
which the claimant seeking correction had no rival claim of their own. That occurred in cases 
where the claimant was a concerned member of the public who sought to correct the 
defendant’s register without advancing a claim of their own, or who was a rival claimant 
putting forward a rival claim that was ultimately found to be misconceived. 
  
Table 1 : Case Properties 
  
Instances 
when 
correction 
would 
prejudice title 
(rectification) 
Instances 
when 
proprietor 
in 
possession 
protection 
engaged 
Instances 
when 
defendant 
proprietor 
in 
possession 
but careless 
Instances 
when 
defendant  
proprietor 
in 
possession 
and careful 
Instances 
when 
entry 
pursuant 
to fraud 
Instances 
when 
correction 
claimant 
had no 
rival 
interest 
  
Instances 
when 
correction 
was 
ordered 
Instances 
decided 
under the 
1925 Act 
  
35 
  
36 
  
8 
  
8 
  
9 
  
8 
  
42  
  
6 
  
The following tables record the use of a factor in the exercise of the discretion if it was one to 
which the court or adjudicator adverted in reaching judgment and did not explicitly reject, 
even if the factor was ultimately found insufficiently compelling to alter the decision. The 
factors included are therefore relevant factors rather than persuasive factors. 
  
Table 2 - The Unwarranted Entry 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- nature of the mistake 14 
- age of the mistake 1 
- other 0 
  
Table 3 - Party Conduct and Knowledge 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- carelessness by a party 19 
- sharp practice by a party 3 
- crime by a party 5 
- crime by a party’s family or employee 0 
- crime by a stranger 0 
- innocent reliance on register 1 
- former owner prevailed upon to make a rescindable transfer 0 
- notice or knowledge of the mistake/dispute prior to acquisition 10 
- other 2 
  
Table 4 - Party Conduct in Litigation 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- delay in bringing or pursuing proceedings 6 
- reprehensible conduct in the course of proceedings 1 
- other 0 
  
Table 5: Personal Characteristics of a Party 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- vulnerability 0 
- old age 0 
- disability, health issues, physical or mental condition 0 
- other 0 
  
Table 6: Emotional or Social Impact on a Party 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 1 
- hardship 0 
- interaction with local community 0 
- sentimental connection to land 1 
- effect on dependants 0 
- other 1 
  
Table 7: Financial Impact on a Party 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- total loss would exceed loss of land (eg business affected) 5 
- extent to which personal wealth can cushion the loss 0 
- whether suitable replacement land could be acquired 0 
- disruption to a party’s larger estate holding 5 
- correction would not prejudice the enforcement of any valuable 
right 
9 
- costs flowing from judgment compliance (eg dismantle a fence) 1 
- other 2 
  
Table 8: Impact on a Person who is Not a Party 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- effect on neighbours 0 
- effect on employees at the land 0 
- effect on people’s enjoyment of things done on the land (eg 
paying customers, paying spectators, public amenity) 
2 
- effect on public services or infrastructure 1 
- desirability of having no registered proprietor at all 2 
- other 2 
  
Table 9: Compensation 
Factor Occurrence 
- unparticularised 0 
- adequacy of the quantum of statutory compensation in reflecting 
market value of the land at the time of the judgment 
4 
- reduction of statutory compensation to reflect carelessness 1 
- other 0 
  
Table 10: Other 
Factor Occurrence 
- usage of land 7 
- investment on improving land 2 
- defendant had no entitlement to be registered 5 
- unanticipated gain  3 
- claimant has no rival entitlement 4 
- other 4 
  
The total number of factors considered varied widely from judgment to judgment. The figures 
are shown in the next table. 
  
Table 11: Number of factors per judgment 
Number of Factors Cited in the Judgment Occurrence 
0 14 
1 6 
2 9 
3 4 
4 11 
5 4 
6 1 
7 0 
8 1 
9 0 
10 0 
11 1 
  
  
Analysis 
  
Thenumerical tabulation of the coded factors was designed to bring out features of the 
exercise of discretion that would prompt further inquiries. They are considered under the 
following subheadings. 
  
(i) Dispersal of factors 
  
The results show that the number of factors considered per judgment ranges from zero to 
eleven, with the most common number of factors being four, and rapidly tailing off beyond 
five.[45]This was not due to the same factors cropping up repeatedly. On the contrary, the 
identity of the factors varied enormously: a total of 30 different factors were considered 
across the judgments.[46] This breadth, coupled with the infrequent usage of each factor, 
indicates a wide dispersal which suggests that the exercise of discretion is far from a 
formulaic rehearsal of a group of typical, standard issues. 
            This finding prompted a return to the judgments to investigate the extent of reliance 
on precedents, derived from a supposition that such a dispersal of factors pointed away from 
unimaginative reliance on prior case law to identify factors. The judgments bore this out, with 
only nine looking to earlier cases in relation to the assessment of the relevance of 
factors.[47]Doubtlessly this low figure reflects the limited value of precedent here, since the 
application of discretionary tests is not within stare decisis, a decision-maker’s failure to 
adhere to superior court’s guidance on discretion is no error of law.[48] Advocates have been 
admonished over citing cases as precedents on discretion[49] but such warnings do not appear 
in any way to have hindered counsel’s vision in identifying an impressive range of factors. 
            The extent of dispersal was affected by the coalescence of factors in certain sequences 
of interconnected events. In a commonplace tale, the former owner might become aware of 
the challengeable entry, alerting the new owner to the existence of a potential dispute, 
generating protracted argument which culminates in the new owner putting up a physical 
obstruction, which goads the claimant into initiating proceedings.[50] This might suggest 
tardiness and inaction (the delay factor), expenditure on fencing (the investment factor) in 
knowledge of an existing dispute (the carelessness factor). To the extent such multiple factors 
are causatively connected, this feature must be understood as a minor caveat to the extent of 
dispersal and the significance of the range in factors. 
  
(ii) Scarcity of personal factors 
  
The courts were willing to look beyond the litigants[51] and examine public impacts,[52] such 
as road safety[53], car parking[54] or responsibility for managing land.[55] But, in the main, the 
results showed that the courts were primarily concerned with the effect of the decision on the 
parties. One striking result was the absence of almost half of the anticipated factors. There 
were two tables where the factors were consistently low - ‘Personal Characteristics of a 
Party’ and ‘Emotional or Social Impact on a Party’ - in which the constituent factors had a 
total of only three encounters.[56] Of those, only in one case was such a factor actually 
applied[57], and the remaining two counts were in a single judgment[58] which merely raised 
them in obiter dicta. 
            The almost total absence of the personal and psychological factors deserves 
consideration. It is submitted that the best explanation is not due to judicialreluctance to 
address such matters, but rather that this is an artefact of the research method. The anticipated 
factors had been initially compiled with an eye to the factors applied in judicial sales of co-
owned land, many of which involved homes and were dominated by the personal impacts of 
remedial options on family members.[59] That contextual profile is not, however, seen in the 
jurisdiction to correct register entries for various reasons. First, around half a dozen 
judgments were essentially boundary disputes where the issue did not involve rending a 
proprietor from all connections to the land or displacement from a community. Secondly, 
cases of intense personal connections are more likely to be settled in anticipation of 
judgment. Thirdly, the acquirer’s personal connections need not be addressed explicitly when 
in occupation since he will fall within the statutory protection for proprietors in 
possession.[60] Fourthly, personal connections would not need to be addressed if the applicant 
is in occupation and his right is an overriding interest. Fifthly, judges may use all-
encompassing labels to describe the circumstances, such as unelaborated references to 
‘home’,[61]without attempting to identify the specific personal connections which it connotes. 
For these reasons the low rate is unlikely to be a representative of either the factual incidence 
of such factors in disputes or the willingness to recognise these as worthy factors when their 
factual foundation arises. 
  
(iii) Relative prospective impacts on parties 
  
In contrast to the scarcity of personal factors, there was substantial judicial reliance on factors 
designed to inflict the least inconvenience or financial loss on the parties. This appeared to 
carry great importance: ‘the starting point should [be] to consider the consequences of 
altering or not altering the title’[62] and ‘the court will wish to consider the effect on the 
relevant parties of an order for rectification or of a refusal to order rectification.’[63] 
            Those statements of principle encapsulated individual factors concerning prospective 
effects and their relative magnitude for each party. The factor comprising ‘investment on 
improving land’[64] embodies the idea of expenditure that would not generate returns if the 
land were restored to another. Similarly, the factor of ‘costs flowing from judgment 
compliance’[65] took account of the remedial expense of restoring the land to its pristine state 
before returning it. In addition, there were allusions to losses exceeding the loss of land[66], 
and five occasions referring to the factor of disruption to an existing larger estate.[67] 
            Oneof the problematic influences on the discretion is the availability of 
indemnity. The study revealed that the parties’ potential entitlements to state compensation 
were an explicit factor, although mentioned in only four instances[68] out of the 34 
rectification claims where indemnity could have ensued. On returning to investigate how this 
factor was employed in decision making, it was observed that its availability to one party 
would be a factor in exercising the discretion so as to withhold rectification from that party or 
to order rectification in favour of the other party.[69] But if the quantification of indemnity 
would not reflect a party’s full loss then that could be a consideration in favour of that 
party.[70] Rectification proceedings are not, however, well suited to a forensic examination of 
indemnity, as the indemnity fund holder is not represented in rectification proceedings and 
the outcome of any indemnity claim has to be speculated upon, perhaps with the addition of 
arguments over contribution and recoupment. This speculation is difficult when even the 
basic criteria of ‘prejudice to title’ (as a precondition to indemnity) and ‘loss’ (prescribing 
eligibility or quantum) have generated controversy.[71] Heavy reliance on indemnity as a 
factor in rectification proceedings is unsatisfactory when such fundamental legal questions 
remain outstanding. 
            Taken together, the factors collected under the rubric of prospective loss, including its 
offsetting by indemnity, are ones which point away from any judicial tendency to rely on 
particular case typologies or party behaviour and the temptation to construct simple, fixed 
rules. Rather they paint a picture of a genuinely discretionary approach which concentrates on 
relative hardship to the parties and on securing an equitable result in the light of the parties’ 
own situations, occupation, expenditure, acts of reliance,and so on. This emphasis on the 
allocation of prospective benefits and burdens not only meets the intention of the reformers 
who put forward the earliest draft discretionary models[72], but also aligns with the doctrine of 
undue hardship as a bar to equitable remedies[73] and, furthermore, attracts policy support 
insofar as it embodies modern economic theory in minimising the costs flowing from the 
clash of rival claims. 
  
(iv) Penetration of carelessness factors 
  
Despite the willingness to range widely across factors in the exercise of discretion, one 
dominating factor was encountered in 19 of the 52 judgments: this was the highest count for 
any factor and related to ‘carelessness by a party’.[74] That was the search term used in 
identifying instances when decisions took account of any behaviour which could be 
characterised as failing to take the steps a reasonable person would have in the circumstances, 
whether or not the term ‘carelessness’ was used in the judgment. Carelessness was taken in 
the search as a broad concept and not as a legal term of art: it was not restricted to any 
particular class of participant, duty relationship, mode of behaviour or sphere of 
activity. Having collated its appearances and reviewed the judgments for possible common 
threads in the typology of carelessness, it was discerned that there existed distinct forms that 
could be used to develop three separate concepts of carelessness for analysis. 
            Thefirst form was identified as the failure to act prudently in one’s own interests. 
Although the judges recognised a person’s investment in developing land as a factor against 
correction[75], that inclination might evaporate if it transpired that he had been on notice of an 
adverse claim beforehand.[76] The implication was that the individual had knowingly omitted 
to safeguard his expenditure against the event of having to restore the land to another. This 
may be perceived as carelessness in looking after one’s own interests. It is in the nature of 
mitigation of harm to oneself and, unlike the next two types of carelessness, does not proceed 
from a free-standing legal duty owed to another party. 
            The second concept of carelessness was failure by a prospective acquirer to act 
carefully during the course of his application to avoid damaging the proprietor’s interests. 
While the mere lodging of an inaccurate application with the registry was not sufficient to 
attract any censure for carelessness[77], it did where the acquirer had lodged a transfer 
knowing the vendor’s power of attorney had been revoked[78], where the plan misrepresented 
the intended boundaries and the applicant did not enlighten the registry[79], where the 
applicant knew of a dispute over the title and did not warn the rival claimant of the 
application[80],or where an applicant for title by adverse possession overstated his case in the 
supporting declaration.[81] 
            The third concept of carelessness was failure to safeguard one’s own title carefully in 
order to avoid putative acquirers’ wasted efforts in acquiring or defending title. This idea may 
appear at first sight to have no place in a registration system designed to give secure title, yet 
the scope for protective behaviour does exist and was a factor in two judgments. In one, the 
claimant had not resolved an outstanding dispute and ignored the registry’s invitation to 
object to the rival claim[82]; in the other, the carelessness comprised a simple failure to 
respond to a land registry proposal to resolve the dispute.[83] It is no surprise that these 
instances are rare. Preventative action typically costs nothing more than a letter asserting 
rights, and carelessness by existing owners (unlike some putative acquirers) is not 
incentivised by any prospect of unbargained gain. 
            The tables included the factor ‘notice or knowledge of the mistake/dispute prior to 
acquisition’.[84] This prompted an inquiry into the nature of notice or knowledge and its 
relationship with carelessness. It has already been seen how several judgments treated as 
carelessness a party’s application for registration when aware that his entry would conflict 
with a rival ownership and yet did not raise this with the registry or the rival[85],but there were 
further judgments in which the knowledge of rival ownership at the time of acquiring was not 
expressed in terms that suggested  failure to act with appropriate care for the owner. Those 
cases could nevertheless be explained as carelessness, even though no such classifying label 
was used in the judgment, since they indicate that the acquirer is (or ought to be) equipped 
with the information to foresee the risk and take steps to avert the harm to the owner. The 
significance is that even more cases[86] swell the statistics which record carelessness. 
            This particular form of the carelessness factor carries the potential to reintroduce 
aspects of the doctrine of notice which registration was intended to eliminate. The cases show 
that actual notice of a defect may be a factor, but this is relatively harmless as it does not 
necessarily presuppose any obligation to make reasonable inquiries and it need not add to the 
burdens of land transfer. The cases also show that objective standards may infiltrate 
carelessness, yet they come nowhere near resembling the taboo doctrine of constructive 
notice doctrine. While they may impose pre-emptive duties, they do not require a purchaser 
to go behind the veil of the vendor’s registration to inquire into possible mistakes in the root 
of title, but relate only to other matters, such as the effectiveness of the immediate transfer 
form to the purchaser or the accuracy of statutory declarations. In establishing objective 
standards for those matters, the case law is, at most,attributing limited weight to entry in the 
register as a factor in correction and readily allowing a factor of morality and social policy to 
tip the scales. 
            In addition to the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, the judgments also reveal 
carelessness factors operating in the statutory ‘unjust’ test which overcomes the immunity of 
a proprietor in possession. Where the proprietor ignored a registry letter proposing to register 
a rival, the inaction overcame his immunity from correction in two cases[87]; in a third case, it 
was his inexplicable failure to take elementary steps to block an unauthorised 
sale.[88] Carelessness extends to exacerbating effectswithout causing the error, as where the 
acquirer ‘compounded the effect’[89] of another’s fraud by persisting in a purchase knowing 
that the seller had been duped by a prior identity theft. Furthermore, it may be noted that 
carelessness was also critical in restoring the jurisdiction to correct in several judgments 
where the protection of a proprietor in possession was defeated by the defendant’s ‘lack of 
proper care’, despite this test not being treated as a discretion within this study. The 
combined mass of these various circumstances for finding carelessness indicates that it is a 
powerful and pervasive force in discretionary decision making and may occur without 
explicit description as such. 
            The reason for the preoccupation with carelessness in all its forms is not evident from 
the judgments but it may be justified as the means to ensure that the party who could most 
easily have prevented the mistake is the one who suffers the loss of title, thus teaching future 
generations to modify their behaviour to minimise the incidence of mistakes at the cheapest 
cost.[90] This, however, seems to be at odds with the judgments noted earlier which emphasise 
the inquiry into the prospective impact of the judgment on the parties. There is a recognisable 
divergence of judicial foci between the ex ante penalising of prior carelessness and ex 
post minimising overall losses to the parties. The approaches do not have to be perceived as 
mutually exclusive, however, and the shortest explanation is that the two apparently coexist 
in a pluralist system, a conclusion that is reinforced by appeal to the implicit statutory 
mandate to pursue a multi-factorial discretionary decision making process. 
  
(v) Reliance on the register 
  
Reliance on the register barely exists as a factor in correction.[91] Under a regime in which the 
information communicated by the register itself isguaranteed and its reversal through 
correction would undermine a transferee’s belief, it is unexpected that it is not a crucial 
element in decision making. Hayton long ago predicted that the correction discretion would 
develop a vigorous principle of routine protection for a transferee for value - a ‘registrar’s 
darling’ principle by extension from ‘equity’s darling’.[92] The data from the study gives the 
impression that this has not come to pass. 
            There is an important doctrinal context which explains in part the dearth of reliance 
factors. Under the 1925 Act, correction was available against subsequent transferees by virtue 
of explicit statutory provision.[93] No equivalent was included in the 2002 Act, leading to 
unsettled case law and the view, prevailing for much of the period covered by the study, that 
transferees were protected against adverse title clams.[94] The legislation also shields 
transferees against unprotected interests affecting title,[95] and for much of the period it was 
assumed that this extended to correction claims.[96] During the period in question, therefore, 
third parties were widely thought to be outside of the correction power. In these 
circumstances it is not surprising that there are few cases considering a third party’s reliance 
on the register.[97] 
            Those doctrinal movements account for the limited incidence of the factor of reliance, 
but they do not tell the full story. Returning to the judgments, there were four occasions when 
jurisdiction was found to rectify against third parties who would otherwise be protected 
through the title and priority rules,[98] and in none of them was reliance on the register 
expressed to be a factor in decision making. In fact, the sole occasion when reliance was 
noted occurred in a case where the defendants’ own act of registering title created the mistake 
and they then ‘arranged their affairs and spent money in reliance on their registered 
title’.[99] Such disinclination to consider reliance is difficult to explain. The importance of 
reliance might have been taken as so obvious that it was not worth mentioning, but that is an 
unlikely explanation when other factors were so clearly addressed in the judgments. Another 
explanation would be that the court has little regard for the significance of entry in the 
register. That would be troubling if it reflected a judicial marginalisation of the fundamental 
ideal of title by registration; but it does not, as there is full discussion of that policy issue in 
the parts of the judgments examining the availability of correction. 
            The better explanation may simply stem from the fact that both parties will have 
relied on the register at some point. The clash arises because the former proprietor would 
have relied on the register as a guarantee of the security of his rights and the latter proprietor 
would have relied on the register as a guarantee of the new acquisition.[100] Reliance does not 
differentiate between the parties and judges may simply regard either party’s reliance as 
sufficiently protected by indemnity. That is certainly a fair inference from Pinto v Lim,[101] for 
example, where the sufficiency of the award of indemnity was a powerful factor in the 
discretion. Beyond that, reliance on the register of itself may have little role to play as a 
factor in discretion. While the nature of the subsequent conduct of the mistakenly-registered 
proprietor should be taken into account, that is true whether or not the particular conduct was 
inspired by knowledge of the register content and a belief in its irreversibility. 
  
(vi) Absence of factors 
  
The results showed that 14 of the 52 judgments involved no consideration at all of any 
factors.[102] Because the judgments had been chosen for their engagement of the correction 
power, this result was sufficiently striking to return to the judgments for explanation. In two 
of the judgments, it was recorded that counsel put forward no factors to justify exceptional 
circumstances. In the remaining twelve of the judgments, the court simply determined that, 
since jurisdiction to correct had been found, it followed that the power should be exercised; it 
was not explicitly stated whether counsel had conceded that there were no exceptional 
circumstances, although it can be inferred that counsel had at least not dwelt on them. The 
adjudicative process requires counsel to raise factors directed towards the relevant threshold, 
and often they did not. 
            In these cases, counsel presumably predicted that argument on such factors would be 
wasted breath.[103] That advocates make such assessments indicates a degree of predictability. 
There are three potential aspects for prediction: whether a putative factor will be recognised 
as relevant, what weight will be attached to it, and how high the court will set the relevant 
threshold. Returning to the judgments for enlightenment, it was found that guidance was 
extremely sparse. There were no general dicta to assist in determining whether a hypothetical 
factor would be relevant. Observations on the relative weight of factors in a given 
factualcontext were infrequent, and there were no clear statements about the general 
attribution of weight to factors. 
            There was, however, limited comment on the standard of exceptional circumstances 
from which a hint of judicial attitudes can be drawn. It is ‘not simply a matter of balancing 
the equities. There have to be exceptional circumstances.’[104] While seemingly trite, this is an 
important reminder that the discretion is not free or unguided but requires a certain level of 
intensity to be reached. The implication that it is set high comes from indications that it must 
be ‘out of the ordinary course, or unusual or special, or uncommon.’[105] Applying the test 
was said to require two stages. ‘(1) are there exceptional circumstances in this case? and (2) do 
those exceptional circumstances justify not ordering rectification?’[106] This formulation omits 
any elaboration of whether the exceptional circumstances refer to the type of circumstances 
or their severity. This has been a significant issue in other legal contexts[107] where it appears 
that factors of a familiar and common type do not pass the test[108], a formula which has 
incurred criticism since ‘however disastrous the consequences may be to family life, if they 
are of the usual kind then they cannot be relied on.’[109] In relation to the context of register 
correction, there is a slim indication pointing the other way that is found in the formula that 
circumstances must be ‘more than merely unfortunate or unusual’[110], in which the reference 
to ‘unfortunate’ suggests that severity might suffice as a criterion for exceptional as much as 
rarity - an approach that is more readily justified than a test based on frequency alone. Clearly 
the test should be reformed to eliminate the ambiguity. Even if the exceptional circumstances 
test does refer to severity, the overall impression is that the exceptional quality is pitched at a 
high level which is significantly outside the normal range. It is perhaps the height at which 
this test is set that tends to encourage the capitulation by counsel, rather than a reluctance to 
entertain particular types of factor. 
  
(vii) Factors, thresholds and outcomes 
  
A typical advantage of systematically surveying judgments is that it enables an examination 
of relationships between the factors and judgment outcomes, particularly those which might 
suggest causative effects or predictive power. Here, however, no support for any such 
correlations can be inferred because the small sample sizes are inadequate for regression 
analysis and because quantitative analysis would be meaningless where the results record 
only an expression of a factor’s potential relevance and not its actual usage. Even when 
whittled down to only those judgments in which the factor was actually in play, there were 
still no perfect one-to-one correlations and the engaged factors yielded such very low 
frequencies than it was not worthwhile to carry out tests of statistical significance. 
            The lack of observable correlations between particular factors and the ultimate 
judgment outcome is ultimately reassuring. Although advisers may find it a hindrance when 
predicting the outcome of litigation, it reinforces theinference that there is no habitual 
reliance on oversimplified rosters of preconceived key factors[111], but instead a meaningful 
search for the telling factors in the instant dispute. In the light of this inference, the judgments 
were revisited to extract comments on the paramountcy, weight or compellingness of any 
particular factor. Apart from an isolated observation that possession attracts special 
weight[112] it transpired that there were no broad assertions intended to function as 
guidance about the abstract strength of factors.[113] Once again this supported the conclusion 
that no one class of factor has a predetermined weighting but its force must depend on its 
intensity in the given dispute, fortifying the impression that the jurisprudence is dedicated to 
factual responsiveness. 
            A more promising line of inquiry relates to the legal thresholds in discretionary 
decision-making and how they can be tallied with the judgment outcomes as a basis for 
understanding how readily the judiciary might find that the tipping point has passed.[114] The 
thresholds are as follows. (i) Under the 1925 Act, where the defendant proprietor is not 
protected as a proprietor in possession, then correction follows only if it is determined that it 
would be ‘just’ to correct; 5 reached the threshold and 1 did not.[115](ii) Under the 2002 Act 
where the defendant proprietor is protected as a proprietor in possession, then correction may 
occur only if the claimant makes out the criterion of fraud or lack of proper care by the 
defendant or the threshold of ‘unjust not to’ correct the entry; 10 reached the criterion or 
threshold necessary for correction[116] while 5 did not. In all of the judgments where that 
threshold was reached, correction of the register was ordered, signifying that the exceptional 
circumstances test was also fulfilled. (iii) Under the 2002 Act, correction must follow unless 
the defendant makes out the threshold of exceptional circumstances. In circumstances where 
the defendant proprietor was not in possession but correction would have prejudicially 
affected his title, only 1 reached the threshold of exceptional circumstances so as to block 
rectification of the register[117], 15 failed, and 1 was remitted. Where correction would not 
have prejudicially affected the defendant proprietor’s title, 1 reached the threshold of 
exceptional circumstances so as to block correction,[118] and 13 failed to do so. 
            Using that conceptual division, the various thresholds were attained in 33 per cent of 
all judgments.[119] From those figures, it is necessary to reject any suggestion that the judges 
set them at an unattainably high standard. There is no undue judicial entrenchment of the 
statutory default position, but an evident willingness to accept that the identified factors may 
reach the threshold, once again reinforcing the picture described above of strongly fact-based 
justice. 
            Thresholds aside, one final observation stands out from the inquiry into how 
frequently judges ordered correction. It was ordered in 43 judgments, remitted in one, and 
declined in eight. Further investigation revealed the eight refusals to have aligned 
consistently with certain prominent features. In six of them, the claimants seeking correction 
had no rival claim of their own, and so the perpetuation of the mistaken entry would not have 
deprived the claimant of anyproperty right.[120] In the seventh, the dispute concerned an 
approximate boundary line which, if corrected, would have shown the boundary with greater 
accuracy but again without depriving the claimant of any property entitlement.[121] The eighth 
case was Pinto v Lim[122] which involved the most compelling of all scenarios, involving as it 
did a registered forgery followed by a transfer for value to a bona fide purchaser who had 
relied on the mistaken entry in the register at the time of buying, who moved in and occupied 
the premises as a home for himself and his wife for over four years, while the claimant was 
primarily interested in the financial value of the land and would receive state 
compensation.[123] 
            If Pinto v Lim is removed from consideration either as the utmost extremity or as a 
relic of a repealed legislative test,[124] then the remaining judgments in which correction was 
refused under the 2002 Act (whether the defendant proprietor was or was not in 
possession) all comprise scenarios in which the mistaken registration of the defendant did not 
cause the claimant to suffer the deprivation of a property entitlement. The two judgments in 
which the mistake was allowed to stand by reason of exceptional circumstances indicate the 
judicial approach.[125] In neither did the court roam far in identifying the relevant factors. In 
the first, the claimant had held no prior interest that had been prejudiced by the mistaken 
change to the register, and the factors relied on all sprang from the claimant’s lack of 
title.[126] In the second, the claimant had an interest which was safeguarded by the general 
boundary principle,[127] and the factors relied on all sprang from the fact that correction would 
have no impact on the claimant’s title or resolve the issue of possession.[128] The exceptional 
factors lie within that narrow compass and do not imply any broad judicial willingness to 
uphold a title acquired by mistaken registration against a former owner. 
            There is no other judgment where the court or adjudicator preserved a mistaken entry 
that had deprived a claimant of a property right. That is a remarkable datum which demands 
consideration. It lends itself to the inference that there is an inclination to correct mistaken 
entries, and that holds sway regardless of whether the particular threshold must be attained in 
order to enable correction or to block correction. 
            In itself, however, it is an insufficient basis for criticism, since the sample of 
judgments may be unrepresentative and it has already been consistently established that the 
courts pay close attention to the full range of factors so that the finding should not fuel any 
allegation of judicial unwillingness to take the exercise of discretion seriously. Nevertheless, 
the datum is a sufficient basis to raise the concern of a possible judicial tendency to correct 
which might be giving inadequate weight to vital issues: the status of registered entries, the 
statutory thresholds, and the parliamentary mandate to examine the relevant factors. That 
concern is only reinforced by cases in which the mistaken status of the entry was expressed to 
be the very reason for exercising the discretion to correct.[129] 
            The correction tendency might be explained as a natural persistence of traditional 
methods of adjudicating property entitlements based not on ad hoc redistribution but upon 
abstract predetermined events that are used as the criteria for determining entitlements. This 
paradigm is deeply ingrained by the concepts of title and ejectment which comprise the 
foundation blocks in unregistered property law.[130] For legal actors immersed in common 
law, it should not be surprising to see an inclination towards rule-based adjudication by 
reference to predictable events understood to affect title, and a disinclination to engage in 
overtly redistributive adjudication which looks to contexts and consequences. 
            The title paradigm does not, however, explain another aspect of the correction 
tendency which is that it consistently prefers former owners as first in time over later 
acquirers who get onto the register under a mistake. To make sense of the observed tendency, 
some basis is required that differentiates the earlier proprietor from the later. The first in time 
preference cannot lie in the impropriety of depriving without consent,[131] as taking property 
away from the later proprietor by correction would be, in legal terms, just as much a 
deprivation as the taking from the earlier proprietor by mistaken registration. One possible 
explanation is that the preference implements an effective preventative policy: that by 
imposing on acquirers the burden of suffering correction, they will in future exercise greater 
diligence in the process of acquisition. The weakness of this potential explanation is that it 
assumes the acquirer to be in thebetter position to ensure a mistaken entry is averted, but that 
is far from self-evident and it may well be that owners themselves could often more easily 
take the necessary steps to forestall the problem, as indicated by the case law on contributory 
negligence.[132] To avoid that weakness, it is possible to suggest a broader explanation that 
there may exist a judicial ethic according to which adjudication ought to focus on the choices 
and actions of the parties, rather than on some particular status they may enjoy which they 
might have had no part in procuring. Such an approach is likely to prioritise the legitimacy of 
the means of acquisition over the mere fact of a register entry. Explicit judicial comments 
occasionally confirm the marginalisation of register entries in this manner;[133] but, inevitably, 
this approach would eventually impede the economic policy underlying the principle of title 
by registration.[134] 
            There remain important contextual observations which might colour the 
understanding of the correction tendency. First, it reinforces the institutional independence of 
the decision-maker from the registry, since judgments fully review the registry action without 
suggesting any deference to the registry’s decisions to change entries.[135] Secondly, the 
jurisdiction to order a change in the register hinges on the vituperative term ‘mistake’ and the 
affirming language of ‘correction’. Being redolent of rights, wrongs and redress, this 
terminology may exert a latent influence onhow the desirability of correcting is perceived. 
Had the statute portrayed register entries as sacrosanct and their alteration in distinctly 
negative terms, then it is easy to imagine that the discretion would be approached very 
differently. If a genuinely discretionary element is to be preserved in correction applications, 
it is submitted that precautionary measures are required to ensure that the correction tendency 
does not become an entrenched reactionary preference for the first in time. This could be 
done by dealing with the contributing influences: by replacing the suggestive statutory 
language with neutral terminology; by creating a presumption against correcting; by 
rewording the exceptional circumstances test to depend upon factor intensity not factor 
frequency; by specifying more precisely the statutory thresholds; and by designating the 
defendant’s actual reliance on a register entry as a non-exhaustive statutory factor to which a 
judge must advert in decision making. 
  
DISCUSSION 
  
When the findings are viewed together it is possible to relate them to several broader themes 
which concern heuristics, syllogisms, guidance and transparency. 
            The decisions in this study gave clear and precise statement of the factors relied upon 
as influencing the exercise of discretion which were substantiated by the fact, and almost 
entirely devoid of rough proxies or any other imperfect but convenient methods of decision-
making.[136] There was no tendency to take short-cuts in decision making, such as over-
generalising a category of factors without adequate attention to its constituent elements, or 
the setting of categories of factors based on unelaborated assumptions.[137] A solitary example 
of an influential factor based on unspoken assumptions occurred in the reference to 
‘home’[138] which should have been substantiated by reference to the specific inhabitant’s 
attachments that would have been lost upon correction of the register and eviction from the 
home, but they are likely to have comprised a rather obvious set of relations with the property 
and its vicinity. In general, judges were patently willing to reimagine afresh in each case what 
specific factors should be influential. This approach of avoiding simplified heuristic 
processes preserves rational strength in the decision making and its costs may be deemed 
acceptable where it exists to determine conflicting private rights rather than merely to pursue 
a cost-effective, policy-led redistribution of resources. 
            The findings are broadly against decision making that is ‘shallow’ or 
‘canalised’.[139] This is another possible manifestation of heuristic reasoning in which 
decision makers routinely search for the presence or absence of a narrow range of leading 
factors and then use them to dictate the outcome, leading to over-simplification of a party’s 
circumstances. The correction decisions avoid that characterisation as the study showed no 
predetermined weighting for particular factors and no habitual repetition of leading 
factors. One potential caveat, however, is the pervasive influence of carelessness. It is 
assumed in the judgments to play a significant role in differentiating one scenario from 
another, but carelessness possesses certain characteristics which should invite suspicion when 
applied to discretionary decision making. Carelessness is highly fact dependent, it represents 
an evaluative standard of great vagueness, it affords much leeway in classifying facts and it 
cannot be determined afresh on appeal.[140] Once discovered, it has powerful force in 
characterising the instant case that creates a logically defensible anchor for decision. There is 
accordingly a temptation for decision makers too grasp too readily at carelessness as a 
convenient determinant. Its frequent usage raises the concern that carelessness might take a 
leading status which subordinates other factors and is liable to rob the decision of its fully 
discretionary quality. 
            The study found a willingness to explore the parties’ individual circumstances without 
adopting preconceived legal formulae. The findings revealed receptiveness to an unlimited 
array of factors and no appetite to fix the weight of any particular factor.[141] This is positive 
in as much as it avoids the erosion of discretion by the mechanical application of abstract, 
syllogistic reasoning. The cases show decision makers paying close attention to the facts, 
identifying those that call for response, and avoiding abstraction in setting advance rules. A 
possible instance of backsliding occurred in cases where the correction claimant lacked a 
rival interest. There existed a striking trend that correction would not be ordered, lending 
itself to the inference that an abstract syllogism might be operating: if the claimant has no 
rival interest, then correction will be declined on the ground of exceptional circumstances. 
            One might also consider the correction tendency in this regard. In no case under the 
2002 Act did the court or adjudicator preserve a mistake whose entry had deprived a claimant 
of a property right. At a stretch this could suggest the foundation for a property heuristic that 
wherever a claimant’s prior rights are prejudiced by a mistake, then correction 
follows. Certainly, the consistent upholding of property rights stands in contrast with the 
rhetoric of discretion. But the mooted heuristic is not substantiated. First, the study shows 
that the fact of a claimant suffering no deprivation of title by the mistake is not a sufficient 
criterion for withholding correction.[142] Second, the study does not provide the evidential 
foundation to prove the negative - that such disputes would never result in withholding 
correction, however compelling the factual basis for protecting the person taking under the 
mistake. On the current state of knowledge, the correction tendency cannot be regarded as a 
tacit rule. 
            If the correction tendency were in future to emerge as a guiding principle, invariably 
leading to correction wherever the claimant was deprived of rights by the mistake, its effect 
would be largely to withdraw the discretionary component in decision making on correction. 
That would leave no judicial room for discretionary manoeuvring and would force attention 
onto the concept of mistake as the determinant of correction. It would be apt to inspire 
arguments over the capacity of mistake to act as a safety valve for hard cases as opposed to 
following some strict algorithm to determine its application, and would risk judicial 
interpretations which oscillate between predictable formalism and counteracting perceived 
unfairness in outcomes.[143] 
            Despite the judicial inclination against syllogistic reasoning in this context, factual 
responsiveness makes for an uneasy relationship with other values. In particular, it restricts 
the guidance on factors available to current and future disputants. While it is clear from the 
judgments studied that all relevant material will be admitted and its weight will not be 
prejudged, there is virtually no further elaboration. An absence of guidance suppresses 
predictability, creates a risk of not treating like cases alike, and smacks of retrospective law-
making.[144] In other discretionary contexts, there is an expectation[145], perhaps even a 
constitutional responsibility[146], on decision makers to formulate guidance. The lack of 
guidance in correction cases might be conditioned by concerns about subverting the 
legislative intent, inflicting on the immediate litigants the costs of setting guidance for 
posterity, and fettering the court’s discretion.[147] Those concerns are, however, are also 
characteristic of other contexts where guidance is forthcoming. It is submitted that litigants in 
correction proceedings already have the basic guidance they need from the statutory 
regulation of the discretion, such as the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test, the ‘proprietor in 
possession’ rule and its provisos, and the known traditions of discretionary adjudication. 
Further regulation may be undesirable as the specific details concerning the relevance and 
weight of factors are inherently inapt for prescribing in advance, being infinitely variable in 
their intensity and incommensurable in quality. Despite the lack of specific judicial 
guidance, the evidence of litigants not contesting the exercise of discretion suggests that the 
decision making already supports at least a modicum of predictability and therefore achieves 
a measure of success in balancing generic guidance against the flexibility to respond to 
unique situations. 
            Finally, making explicit the principled basis for decision making is not only an issue 
of predictability, but also a rule of law issue concerning transparency in adjudication. The 
judgments show that the range of factors is fully addressed in the chain of reasoning, but 
the lack of detail in assessing the relative weight of factors is a particularly marked and 
common deficit in the transparency necessary for accountability. It is not suggested that this 
is complacency born of the knowledge that the discretion is effectively 
unappealable.[148] Nevertheless, the consequence is that cases are disposed on the basis of 
unspoken value judgments about the relative weighting. While there may be a sense that 
forensic argument over value hierarchies is unnecessary in a collegial discipline of shared 
values and would be alien to the common law process, this represents an unsolved challenge 
for correction proceedings and adjudicative discretions in general. 
  
CONCLUSION 
  
The foremost feature of register correction, when seen as a composite of the legislative 
framework and the judicial handling of discretion, is its highly discretionary quality. It has 
not been cut down by the emergence of any rigid, restrictive rules. There is no empty 
repetition of some set formula; no single factor is universally accepted as decisive; the weight 
of individual factors is not predetermined but responsive to the context. Shallowness and 
short-cuts have been avoided. The eligible factors and their respective weightings have not 
been reduced to an abstract syllogism, save for a potential reservation when the claimant 
lacks a rival title, and little attention is paid to earlier precedents. The judicial component has 
enriched this part of the registration system by infusing it with consideration of all manner of 
real world events. At the same time, there remains sufficient predictability on some occasions 
to enable counsel to settle in anticipation of the outcome. In addition, the statutory thresholds 
are seemingly applied at an appropriate level, being neither irrebuttable on the one hand, nor 
inconsequential on the other. These features of the jurisprudence are collectively indicative of 
a serious judicial commitment to the importance of responding to individual circumstances in 
cases of mistake. 
            The impression of meticulous judicial investigation across a wide range of relevant 
factors is, however, overshadowed by the lack of substantive effect on outcomes. At first 
glance the findings seem paradoxical: great pains are taken to ensure a highly fact-specific 
discretion, yet the observed propensity to correct implies that discretion has little significance 
in decision making. The latter point must not, however, be overstated as the correction 
tendency has little claim to represent a judicial principle. Were it to fossilise as a rule, 
it would demand urgent attention as a judicial negation of the statutory discretion and as a 
direct challenge to registration of title, downgrading its role from a means to reallocate 
property rights to a mere financial guarantee. But the observed tendency is currently 
insufficient to conclude that the rehearsal of discretionary factors is simply window dressing, 
and it does not yet justify more than a degree of scepticism over the responsiveness claimed 
for the discretion. 
            The study provides a view on judicial attitudes towards the significance of register 
entries. The case outcomes exhibit a preponderance of correction orders, transcending the 
various statutory thresholds, which suggests that the fact of registration alone is a weak 
reason for confirming title and that it is overtaken by all manner of circumstances external to 
the register. This view is supported by other aspects of the judgments; for example, reliance 
on the register is almost entirely absent from the factors considered, and non-consensual 
vesting by registration is occasionally given, without more, as a reason to correct. The 
register is not altogetherdisregarded, however, as entry on the register was shown to have 
significance when one party had relied on his own entry and the other party had never had a 
corresponding opportunity for reliance. In correction proceedings the influence of a register 
entry may be slight, yet that does not in any sense signal defiance of the registration system. 
The correction clause has delegated to judges the power (at least where title would be 
prejudiced) to select between the property right and the financial guarantee of indemnity. 
Although correction decisions show a judicial inclination to take advantage of that liberty by 
tilting decision-making heavily in favour of human factors in preference to the register, that 
choice of emphasis does not stray beyond the delegated power and cannot be stigmatised as a 
frustration of the legislative scheme. 
            Judicial decision-making has shown extensive reliance on carelessness factors and 
this, too, may prompt concerns over the registration-mindedness of the judicial input. The 
risk here is not merely paying too slight attention to the register, but rather that the judicial 
approach may be directly undermining the register. This could occur because carelessness 
factors extend to penalising a party who presses ahead despite notice of an off-register issue 
casting doubt on his acquisition. It raises questions over the doctrine of notice, which 
registration was designed to eliminate. The study explained how judges have stopped short of 
inquiring into constructive notice of matters behind a transferor’s register entry and so it is 
decidedly premature to announce the resurrection of the equitable doctrine of notice and the 
judicial undermining of the register. This is, however, an important and controversial domain 
for the carelessness factor which, if left to grow unchecked, could conflict with a primary 
goal of the registration system. 
            The study also provides a perspective on the values which are brought into 
registration when judges resolve title conflicts unconstrained by statutory rules. One cluster 
of factors points towards the outcome which creates the least prospective suffering by the 
parties. It corresponds to an objective of limiting the future hardship or cost to the litigants 
which maps onto a norm of efficient redistribution after a title conflict has arisen. Judicial 
references to public interest indicate that this value extends beyond the litigants’ positions to 
the wider costs falling on society. Overtaking those influences, however, is an even more 
powerful current of factors which dwell on past carelessness. They encapsulate two judicial 
values: punishing those who squander their opportunities to avoid title conflict and 
establishing guidance on standards to instil future precautionary practices. The combination 
of factors, implying ex post efficiency, moral desert and ex ante care, indicates a panoply of 
values just as broad as that found in common law property, equally lacking in 
hierarchy,[149] and curtailed (as illustrated by the approach to constructive notice) only as 
needed to avert direct conflict with the rules ofregistration. 
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